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SECRET

RME:djm 11 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Suppliers

SUBJECT

: Release of Project Developed Systems, Subsystems, Components, Techniques and Technical Know-How

to Department of Defense

1. Purpose: It is the purpose of this memorandum to set forth the basic policy of this Headquarters regarding the release of Project developed information to other than Project cleared persons and to outline a procedure for implementing this policy.

2. Security Standards: It is re-emphasized that from its inception access to knowledge of or information about this Project has been consistently limited to individuals who are not only acceptable from a security point of view but have a valid "need-to-know" about it. With few exceptions, such considerations as a high official position, the possession of security clearances for sensitive data, or an official interest in some general area of development or operation have not been accepted as sufficient reasons for admitting an individual to knowledgeability. As suppliers are aware an effort has been made to apply this policy to all persons regardless of their place in Government or private industry although some erosion of security standards has inevitably occurred; partly as a result of the sheer number of individuals with a valid "need-to-know" but partly by reason of the pressure to cut in individuals on the basis of position or "responsibility" for a certain field of

activity. One purpose of this memorandum is to prevent further erosion of standards without inhibiting a desirable spread of knowledge of subsystems developed for the Project.

- 3. General policy: Within the limits set by the requirement for continued security, the basic policy will be to permit the release with only a low security classification of information on subsystems to unwitting personnel who are cleared for the low classification involved, with the exceptions stated in paragraph 4. below. On the other hand, knowledge of the existence of an integrated weapons system based upon the U-2 aircraft and including all the subsystems remains highly classified and every effort must be made to withhold such knowledge from unwitting personnel. It is possible at this time to reduce the classification on subsystems only because no one subsystem is regarded as highly sensitive in itself and only if information concerning the subsystem is handled in such a way as not to permit unwitting personnel to infer the existence of the total weapons system.
- 4. Specific Rules: The following specific provisions which give effect to the general policy stated above should guide all suppliers in handling information concerning the Project's subsystems:
- a. The existence of the U-2 aircraft itself has been acknowledged in carefully worded press releases which have attributed to it (by inference) a range of perhaps 1800 nautical miles and a ceiling of about 55,000 feet.

 Photographs designed to reveal as little as possible concerning the aircraft's

performance have received some circulation among military components overseas and may soon be released for publication. Nevertheless, the aircraft carries an official classification of SECRET (so physical access to it can be denied and security precautions explained), and its true performance is classified TOP SECRET and may be made knowledgeable only to witting personnel. Likewise, the fact that it is a reconnaissance aircraft and any association of the subsystems with the U-2 should be revealed only to witting personnel.

- b. Each supplier of a subsystem is at liberty to disclose the existence of the subsystem as an already designed and developed piece of equipment and to provide information concerning its performance to potentially interested agencies of the United States Government and to business firms to which such disclosure is necessary in order to encourage the widest use of the subsystem for the purposes of the United States Government. Where it is desired to make disclosure to exploit a purely commercial opportunity prior clearance must be obtained. Information about each subsystem will normally carry the classification of "CONFIDENTIAL" in order to protect it from publication.
- c. In disclosing information concerning a subsystem, the supplier must be prepared with a plausible and tenable explanation of its development. In many cases it may be sufficient to state it was developed for a TOP SECRET project concerning which no information whatever can be

released. In other cases it may be plausible to explain the idea as having been developed by the supplier with its own resources. In no case can unwitting persons be permitted access to test data or records of experience of the subsystems which reveal anything concerning the Project or other elements of the total weapons system of which the subsystem is a component.

PROJECT SECURITY OFFICER

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